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Act of State: The Fundamental Inquiry of Situs
Determination for Expropriated Intangible
Property: Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C.
In the past ten years, U.S. banks and investors have extended
vast amounts of credit to foreign borrowers, particularly Latin Amer-
ican governments, their instrumentalities, and commercial entities
subject to control by these governments. Experiencing deteriorating
economic conditions, many of these borrowers have chosen to repu-
diate their debts or have been forced by governmental decrees to
scale back their repayments. Although the credit agreements cover-
ing these loans and investments have been carefully crafted, they
have not anticipated the application of the act of state doctrine,
which bars U.S. courts from examining the lawfulness of actions
taken by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.'
Much of the confusion experienced by the courts in applying the
doctrine has arisen from their inability to determine properly the si-
tus of these foreign loans and investments. Determining the appro-
priate situs of intangible property interests is fundamental to the act
of state analysis. This issue was recently addressed in Braka v.
Bancomer, S.N.C. 2 when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that because the situs
of plaintiffs' certificates of deposit was Mexico, the act of state doc-
trine applied. This decision barred the courts from reviewing the
enactment of exchange controls and nationalization of banks by
Mexico, generating losses on investments at redemption.5
The plaintiffs in Braka were U.S. citizens who purchased peso-
and dollar-denominated certificates of deposit (CDs) from
Bancomer, S.A., a privately-run Mexican bank.4 In September 1982
the Mexican government nationalized Mexican banks, including
I RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 428
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983).
2 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
s Id. at 223-24.
4 Id. The value of the certificates was $2,100,000. All the certificates matured in
February 1983 except one, which reached maturity in September 1982. The annual inter-
est rates ranged from 14.3% to 23.25%. Id.
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Bancomer, and mandated a system of exchange controls.5 When the
plaintiffs tendered the CDs on their maturity dates, they received
Mexican pesos at the new official exchange rates which did not ap-
proximate the maturity value of the certificates,6 resulting in a
900,000 dollar loss for the plaintiffs. 7 Subsequently, plaintiffs
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York8 claiming damages for breach of contract and for
violation of federal securities law. The district court dismissed plain-
tiffs' complaint holding that the act of state doctrine prevented judi-
cial review of the government's acts because the situs of the property
affected was in Mexico and the Mexican imposition of exchange con-
trols was a proper governmental function.9
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' com-
plaint on act of state grounds.' 0 In reviewing the district court's de-
cision that the act of state doctrine applied, the court noted that its
analysis must begin with a determination of the situs of the property
taken by the Mexican exchange controls." I In addressing this issue,
the court noted that the CDs named Mexico City as the place of de-
posit and the place for payment of interest and principal.' 2 The
plaintiffs had argued that the situs was New York because they
purchased the CDs by giving checks to Bancomer's New York agency
and received interest payments in New York. The court focused on
the contractually mandated situs of the obligation and therefore con-
cluded that the proper situs was Mexico.' 5 Given this determination,
the court agreed that the act of state doctrine applied and precluded
judicial.review. To rule otherwise and intervene would be an imper-
missible intrusion into the governmental activities of a foreign
sovereign.' 4
The Braka decision represents another chapter in the confusing
and uncertain history of the application of the act of state doctrine to
sovereign actions. The classic statement of the doctrine' 5 was first
5 Id.
6 The plaintiffs received Mexican pesos at the controlled exchange rate of 75 pesos
per dollar when the market exchange rate was 150 pesos per dollar. Id.
7 Id.
8 Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), afd, 762 F.2d 222
(2d Cir. 1985).
9 762 F.2d at 223.
10 d. at 224.
it Id.
12 Id.
IS Id. at 224-25.
14 Id. at 225.
15 The roots of the act of state doctrine appear to have taken hold in England in Blad
v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (1674), and began to emerge in the case law
of the United States in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), the Court dismissed the
claim of a U.S. citizen who brought an action against the French for the wrongful posses-
sion of his schooner. The Court concluded that despite the asserted right to ownership of
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promulgated by the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernzndez,16 in
which the Court recognized that governmental acts by a sovereign
within its own territory are not subject to adjudication by the courts
of another sovereign nation. In Underhill the Supreme Court dis-
missed the claim of a U.S. citizen who was detained in Venezuela by a
revolutionary general. The Court formulated a two-prong inquiry
for evaluating act of state claims. First, is the act in question one of
"the acts of the government?"' 7 Second, if it is a governmental act,
is it "done within its own territory?"' 8 The second question obvi-
ously relates to a proper determination of situs.
The modern formulation of the act of state doctrine came in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,19 a case arising from the 1960
Cuban nationalization of property owned by U.S. nationals. After a
commodities broker refused to pay Banco Nacional, a Cuban instru-
mentality, for its tendering of bills of lading on a sugar shipment,
Banco Nacional brought suit against the broker for conversion of the
bills of lading. 20 The Supreme Court applied the act of state doc-
trine to bar a counterclaim against Cuba and refused to examine the
validity of the Cuban expropriation decrees. 21 The Court made it
clear that the import of the doctrine was to negate the likely impact
on international relations that would result from judicial considera-
tion of the act of a foreign sovereign. Ifjudicial review would embar-
rass or hinder the executive in the realm of foreign relations, a court
should refrain from inquiring into the act of the foreign state.22
The Sabbatino opinion was met with severe criticism, 23 and
within a few months, the Hickenlooper Amendment24 was enacted to
the plaintiff, the ship, at the time of suit, was in the service of a foreign sovereign and was
therefore exempt from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. Id. at 147.
16 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open




'9 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
The Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles even if the
complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
Id. at 428.
20 376 U.S. at 401-06.
21 Id. at 439.
22 Id. at 431-33.
23 Ebenroth, Winning (or Losing) by Default. The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity
and Comity in International Business Transactions, Ir'L LAw. (Winter 1985). at 228.
24 Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1979)).
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nullify a portion of the Sabbatino opinion by prohibiting a court from
refusing to reach the merits in expropriation cases that involve a vio-
lation of international law. Additionally, the Supreme Court made
two subsequent attempts after Sabbatino to clarify the act of state doc-
trine: by considering the "Bernstein exception" (the doctrine might
not apply when the executive branch has affirmatively expressed its
position),2 5 and by focusing on the possible existence of an excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine when the sovereign is engaged in
commercial activity.26 Unfortunately, these exceptions further mud-
dled the doctrine and led to considerable uncertainty in the courts as
to the parameters of the act of state doctrine. 27
U.S. courts, however, have uniformly held that extraterritorial
seizures are not protected by the act of state doctrine. It is well set-
tled that domestic courts will not give effect to foreign confiscatory
decrees over property within the United States.28 Because judicial
scrutiny of acts affecting property outside another nation's bounda-
ries involves no affront to territorial sovereignty, U.S. courts are free
to judge such acts under domestic legal standards, unfettered by the
act of state doctrine.2 9 Given the extraterritorial exception, situs is
of paramount importance because the act of state doctrine will not
25 In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), Cuba
sued for the excess resulting from the sale of its collateral for a loan made by Citibank.
The sale took place after the seizure of all bank branches located in Cuba. The State
Department indicated that the act of state doctrine should not be applied to prevent the
assertion of Citibank's counterclaim. Four widely divergent opinions were filed, of which
no single proposition commanded a majority. The opinion filed by Justice Rehnquist, and
joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White, asserted that the judiciary may decide a
case if there is a communication from the executive branch that the act of state doctrine
should not or need not be applied. Id. at 767.
26 In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), after
the nationalization by Cuba in 1960 of the business and assets of five leading cigar manu-
facturers, the former owners brought actions for the purchase price of cigars that had been
shipped to importers from the seized Cuban plants. Justice White, joined by three other
Justices, advanced the theory that the act of state doctrine should not be extended to acts
in the course of purely commercial operations. Id. at 705. This restrictive approach to
sovereign immunity was based on the same rationale as that used by Congress in enacting
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(3), 1391(f),
1441(d), 1601-1611 (1982).
27 Note, An Approach to Act of State: Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus
Derivados v. Lamborn and Co., 7 N.CJ. INr'L L. & CoM. REG. 409, 409 (1982).
28 United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976) (money
with situs in New York not affected by Pakastani act of state); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bot-
ding Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1972) (expropriation of Cuban Brewing Corpora-
tion by Cuba did not affect use of its U.S. trademark registered in the United States);
Tabacalera SeverianoJorge v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715 (5th Cir. 1968) (sub-
ject of alleged taking by Cuba was creditor domiciled in Florida; confiscation ineffective);
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1027 (1966) (money with situs in New York not affected by Iraqi act of state); Tran
Qui Than v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (bank assets in New
York not reachable by Director of Saigon Bank).
29 Note, Act of State-Forei Expropriation Decres-Act of State Doctrine Does Not Enable
Foreign Sovereign to Confiscate Debts with Situs in the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 567, 573
(1977).
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apply if the expropriated property is determined to be situated
outside the territorial boundaries of the foreign sovereign.
For expropriated tangible property, situs determination is rela-
tively straightforward. The property is either physically within or
without the foreign sovereign's boundaries and control. On the
other hand, the situs of expropriated intangible property, such as
loans and investments, is much more difficult to establish. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this in Tabacalera SeverianoJorge,
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Company o when it stated that "the situs of in-
tangible property is about as intangible a concept as is known to the
law."31
As a general rule, the situs of a debt depends upon jurisdiction
over the debtor.3 2 For act of state purposes, the courts have gener-
ally applied this rule, citing Harris v. Balk,33 in determining the situs
of such property to be within the state that has the power to enforce
or collect it. s4 Yet the courts have recently expanded this test to
cover situations in which jurisdiction over the debtor was based on
factors other than domicile, such as the contacts the debtor had
within the United States.3 5 The rationale in refusing to use solely
the domicile test is that application of that test would almost always
place the loan in the foreign nation and would allow the act of state
doctrine to be used by foreign nations as a mechanism to avoid pay-
ment of debts.3 6 Finally, in more recent cases, the situs test has been
30 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968). A Cuban corporation and its sole stockholder (a
resident of Florida) as assignee brought an action against a Florida corporation to recover
a sum owed to the Cuban corporation for tobacco sold to the Florida corporation before
the Cuban revolution. In determining that the suit was not barred by the act of state
doctrine, the court concluded that the account receivable of the Cuban corporation was
not property in Cuba because the Cuban government was not physically in a position to
perform afait accompli over the receivable. Id. at 715. Thus, the court fashioned a new test
whereby the situs of expropriated property depends in large part on whether the pur-
ported taking can be said to have "come to complete fruition within the dominion of the
foreign government." Id.
31 Id. at 714. Additionally, the court stated:
The situs may be in one place for ad valorem tax purposes, Farmers Loan
and Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204; it may be in another place
for venue purposes, i.e., garnishment, Chicago R.I. & R.R. Co. v. Sturm, 174
U.S. 710; it may be in more than one place for tax purposes in certain cir-
cumstances, Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357; it may be in still a different
place when the need for establishing its true situs is to determine whether an
overriding national concern, like the application of the Act of State Doctrine
is involved.
Id. at 714-15.
32 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1905). Although another aspect of Harris has
been overruled, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 435 U.S. 186 (1977), the debt-situs holding remains
unimpaired.
33 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
34 See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1976);
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1365 (2d Cir. 1973).
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further broadened beyond jurisdictional considerations by the
court's willingness to implement policy considerations, specifically
the protection of foreign property located in the United States and
the protection of U.S. property interests located abroad 3 7
These issues are well illustrated in two recent actions brought by
the lead banks of syndications that extended large loans to Costa
Rica. In Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 38 the syndica-
tion lent forty million dollars to a banking concern wholly owned by
the Costa Rican government. Pursuant to a governmental decree
that suspended payment on Costa Rica's external debt, Banco Na-
cional ceased payments on its debt. In the action brought by Libra
Bank, the district court held that the situs of the debt was New York
and hence the act of state doctrine did not preclude the court from
inquiring into the validity of the Costa Rican decree. Summaryjudg-
ment was granted to Libra Bank.3 9 No appeal was requested as the
parties eventually joined in a rescheduling of the loan package.
In determining that the situs of the debt was in New York, the
court was influenced by the fact that under the loan agreement,
Banco Nacional consented to the jurisdiction of the district court;
that Banco Nacional was to make all payments to The Chase Manhat-
tan Bank in New York City; and that Banco Nacional had two and a
half million dollars in various New York City bank accounts.40 Addi-
tionally, the court stated that even if a creditor can sue a debtor in his
foreign domicile, a U.S. court may still find that the situs of the debt
was in this country at the time of attempted confiscation.4'
In Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago42 a
banking syndication lent ten million dollars to an instrumentality of
the Costa Rican Central Bank. Pursuant to the decree discussed
above, Banco Credito ceased payments on the loan. Allied acceler-
ated the debt and then sued for the unpaid principal and interest. In
its initial decision the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine to bar review of the Costa Rican
decree. Upon rehearing, the Second Circuit reversed its prior deci-
sion, holding that the act of state doctrine did not apply to the loan
defaults because the situs of the bank's obligation was in New
York.43 Summary judgment was granted to Allied.44
37 See Note, supra note 29, at 581.
38 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
39 Id. at 871.
40 Id. at 881-82.
41 Id. at 881. Further, the court noted that this analysis is consistent with the histori-
cal formula set forth in Harris, 198 U.S. at 222. ("The obligation of the debtor to pay his
debt dings to and accompanies him wherever he goes.")
42 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985).
43 757 F.2d at 523.
44 Id. at 518.
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In Allied Bank the court made reference to the Tabacalera test4 5
whereby the situs of expropriated property depends in large part on
whether the purported taking can be said to have "come to complete
fruition within the dominion of the foreign government."'4 6 Without
elaboration, the court concluded that Costa Rica could not wholly
extinguish the Costa Rican banks' obligation to pay U.S. dollars to
Allied in New York and the situs was therefore not Costa Rica.4 7
The court also supported its situs determination by noting that the
Costa Rican banks conceded jurisdiction in New York, they agreed to
pay the debt in New York City, and some of the negotiations between
the parties took place in the United States.4 8 Various policy reasons
were also cited for locating the debt situs in New York-principally,
the protection of U.S. creditors. 49
Although Braka yielded a result contrary to that in Libra Bank
and Allied Bank, the Braka court, in fixing the situs of the expropri-
ated CDs, used reasoning similar to that of the Libra Bank and Allied
Bank opinions. The underlying analysis for these three decisions fo-
cused on the terms of the credit agreements, whether the foreign
debtor had conceded to U.S. jurisdiction, the designated place for
payment of principal and interest, and the extent to which the for-
eign debtor had assets in the United States. The Braka analysis, how-
ever, differed from Libra Bank and Allied Bank in that it placed greater
emphasis on the contractually mandated situs of the CDs, naming
Mexico City as the place of deposit and of payment of interest and
principal. 50 The court was not influenced by the plaintiffs' argument
that the CDs had been purchased in New York, and instead, relied
exclusively on its contractually mandated situs determination.5 1
Further, absent from the Braka opinion are the policy considera-
tions found in Libra Bank and Allied Bank in which .the courts cited
protection of the U.S. creditor to support their conclusion that the
United States was the situs of the debts. As noted previously, the use
of such policy considerations and factors extrinsic to the parties'
agreement in resolving the situs issue results in a more expansive
test enabling the courts to fix more readily the situs of the expropri-
ated intangible property in this country. On the other hand, the
45 See supra note 30 for a discussion of Tabacalera.
46 757 F.2d at 521.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 521-22. The court stated:
The United States has an interest in assuring that creditors entitled to pay-
ment in the United States in United States dollars under contracts subject to
the jurisdiction of United States courts may assume that, except under the
most extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined in accord-
ance with recognized principles of contract law.
Id.
50 Braka, 762 F.2d at 224-25.
51 Id.
19861 Braka
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Braka approach focuses mainly on the credit instrument itself and
ascertains the situs from the terms of the contract between the
parties.
In this regard, Braka can possibly be reconciled with the earlier
decisions by the fact that the materiality of the investment in Braka
did not approach the magnitude of the large loans found in Allied
Bank and Libra Bank. The Braka court referred to the Sabbatino opin-
ion in which "the Supreme Court directed that each case be analyzed
individually to determine the need for a separation of powers."'52
Additionally, there is language in the Braka opinion to support the
contention that the court opted not to intervene because the facts
did not warrant judicial review.55 Although the Braka court confines
its analysis of the situs issue to the terms of the credit instrument, it
appears that it will continue to adhere to the flexible approach for-
mulated in Sabbatino. The court seems to reserve application of a
situs test that considers policy considerations and factors extrinsic to
the credit instrument for facts that might motivate the court to look
beyond the parties' contract. If Braka and the other plaintiffs had
been large commercial entities with excessive foreign loan exposure
rather than private individual investors, the outcome might have
been different.
Despite the above differences, Braka is consistent with several
recent Mexican currency control cases" that had factual situations
similar to Braka and had dismissed plaintiffs' claims on act of state
grounds. These decisions, along with Braka, found that while the de-
fendant banks' activities were commercial, the cause of actions arose
from the bank's conduct as required by the Mexican government's
imposition of currency controls and bank nationalization. The Braka
court noted that to intervene and contradict the result of the ex-
change controls would be an impermissible intrusion into the gov-
ernmental activities of a foreign sovereign. 55 Thus, in addition to
Braka's analysis of the situs issue in a more formal and technical man-
ner than that found in earlier cases, the Braka court appears to ad-
here to the spirit of the act of state doctrine by not placing the U.S.
judicial branch at odds with policies established by a foreign govern-
ment which are public and regulatory in nature.
In so doing, the Braka court seems to recognize that involved in
a judicial determination of the location of expropriated intangible
52 Id. at 224.
53 Id. "Our examination of the facts in the instant case convinces us that the district
court was correct in ruling that the relevant considerations mitigate against judicial inter-
vention." Id.
54 E.g., Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cal-
lejo v. Bancomer, CA-3-82-1604-D (N.D. Tex. 1984); Frankel v. Banco Nacional de Mex-
ico, S.A., No. 82-6457 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
5 Braka, 762 F.2d at 225.
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property are two pragmatic and related considerations: the futility
and perhaps detrimental effect of ruling on afait accompli by a foreign
government and the realization that the court is powerless to do any-
thing about it.56 If the foreign government's act has been made sub-
stantially effective within its borders, U.S. courts will be unable to
grant meaningful relief.57 In such a situation the party injured by the
act of state can only attain meaningful recovery with the help of the
political branches. 58
In terms of future international finance disputes addressing an
act of state by a foreign country, Braka's reliance on the contractually
mandated situs of the CDs to fix the place of expropriation should
have desirable consequences. It provides a standard whereby inves-
tors and foreign governments alike can predict with reasonable cer-
tainty the judicial outcome. When it appears the contractual situs of
an investment or loan, as determined from the credit instrument it-
self, is located in a foreign country, an investor should probably seek
help from the executive branch instead of the judiciary. Similarly,
such a standard will provide uniform assurances to a foreign govern-
ment that actions taken to put its economic house in order will not
be subject to extensive litigation in the United States. Unfortunately,
U.S. creditors must continue to be wary of foreign governmental ac-
tions that may impair their right to repayment. 59
A proposed solution to the situs question suggests that an act be
considered "done" within the territory of a foreign sovereign when
that sovereign has the power to make the action substantially effec-
tive.60 When the expropriated property is tangible, this analysis ar-
rives at the same result as standard theories for determining the
applicability of the act-the situs of the property at the time of the
expropriation is dispositive. 61 When intangible property is involved,
this approach in effect places the property in the country that can
most significantly affect the legal interests in that property. 62 This
proposed solution, however, appears to be a restatement of the Taba-
calera test whereby the situs of expropriated property depends in
large part on whether the purported taking can be said to have
"come to complete fruition within the dominion of the foreign
government."s6
56 See Note, The Act of State Doctrine-Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Company v.
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Company, 10 BROOXL.YNJ. IN'L L. 243, 250 (1984).
57 Comment, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank
Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 495 (1985).
58 Id.
59 Note, Act of State: Treatment of Foreign Defaults in Domestic Courts, 25 HARv. If't L.J.
195, 200 (1984).
6 Comment, supra note 57, at 493.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See supra note 30 for a discussion of Tabacalera.
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The Braka decision is certainly helpful in that the decision for-
mally and technically addressed the important issue of situs determi-
nation for expropriated intangible property. Prior cases placed less
emphasis on this threshold question which is fundamental to
whether the act of state doctrine will apply. Further, the approach of
the Braka court in focusing on the contractually mandated situs of
the credit instrument yields a standard not so heavily influenced by
policy considerations and factors extrinsic to the parties' agreement.
Such a standard could provide uniform results and more predictabil-
ity for investors and foreign governments alike. Unfortunately, the
question remains whether the court might opt to look beyond the
parties' contract when faced with facts having a greater financial im-
pact than those in Braka.
-JAMES A. JOHNSON
